practitioners and students in mental health fields accept the Dodo bird verdict simply because it appears to be generally and uncritically accepted by others.
In the past two decades, numerous meta-analyses have been published that examine this question of psychotherapy equivalence. Hunsley and Di Giulio (2002) critically reviewed this literature and concluded that there was abundant evidence that the Dodo bird verdict is false. In this article, we begin by summarizing Hunsley and Di Giulio's (2002) review and then provide an updated review of relevant metaanalyses and comparative treatment studies published since Hunsley and Di Guilio's review. We consider evidence from (a) treatment outcome studies that compare the treated group with a control group to whom no services are provided (typically, a wait-list control group) and (b) comparative treatment studies that compare at least two active treatments (with a no-treatment control group sometimes, but not always, included). Clearly, comparative treatment studies are most relevant to the Dodo bird verdict as they provide a "head-to-head" comparison of treatments drawing on the same sample of clients randomly assigned to each condition. For the most part, the results we present use the d statistic for estimating the effect size of treatments (i.e., the difference between treatments or between treatment versus no treatment is expressed in standard deviation units); in some instances, when useful for interpretative purposes, we also provide information on other types of effect sizes. Finally, we briefly discuss the implications of these findings for psychotherapy research and current efforts to promote evidence-based psychotherapeutic practices.
Before considering the meta-analytic evidence, it is important to note that many authors have raised scientific cautions to consider when interpreting evidence that appears to indicate psychotherapy equivalence (Beutler, 1991; Cujipers, 1998; Hsu, The Behavior Analyst Today Brady Page 132 2000; Norcross, 1995; Reid, 1997; Shadish & Sweeney, 1991; Stiles, Shapiro, & Elliott, 1986) . Treatment fidelity, researcher theoretical allegiance, and measurement quality should all be considered before tentatively accepting that there may be no true difference between treatments in a given study. Sample size is also a critical element. Kazdin and Bass (1989) calculated that, based on the typical differences found between treatments, researchers wishing to compare two or more treatments should plan to include over 70 participants per treatment condition if they wish to have adequate power to detect treatment differences. Hunsley and Di Giulio (2002) Smith, Glass, and Miller (1980) conducted the first meta-analysis of psychotherapy. Based on several hundred treatment outcome and comparative treatment studies, they found strong evidence for significant differences among effects of different types of therapy (Table 5 -4, p.94): Treatment outcome studies indicated that cognitive and cognitive-behavioral treatments had the largest effect sizes (mean d values of 1.31 and 1.21, respectively), followed by behavioral and psychodynamic treatments (0.91 and 0.78), humanistic treatments (0.63), and developmental treatments (including vocational-personal development counseling and "undifferentiated counseling"; 0.42). The authors then analyzed their data based on client diagnoses and again found substantial differences among treatment types (Table 5 -5, p.96).
Meta-Analytic Evidence Presented by
These, however, are not the results presented by advocates of the dodo bird verdict; instead, they focus on Smith et al.'s (1980) "classes" were constructed by grouping cognitive-behavioral, behavioral, behavior modification, systematic desensitization, and other behavioral treatments in the behavioral class and grouping psychodynamic, humanistic and cognitive treatments in the verbal class. The logic of classifying cognitive treatments with psychodynamic and humanistic treatments is highly questionable, yet it is only in these analyses, among the dozens reported by Smith et al., and 1984 and concluded that there was strong evidence for the superiority of behavioral treatments (including cognitive treatments) over nonbehavioral treatments. Subsequently, Weisz, Weiss, Han, Granger, and Morton (1995) therapist experience), Weiss and Weisz (1995) evaluated the relative effectiveness of behavioral (including cognitive) versus nonbehavioral (psychodynamic and humanistic) treatments in a subset of the studies used by Weisz et al. (1987) . This meta-analysis included 105 studies of treatments for anxiety disorders, depression and social skills deficits. Controlling for methodological quality, the mean d values of behavioral and nonbehavioral treatments were 0.86 and 0.38, respectively, with the relative difference even greater in the 10 comparative treatment studies in the sample that directly compared behavioral to nonbehavioral treatments (mean d values of 0.76 and 0.17, respectively). Reid (1997) reviewed findings from 42 focused meta-analyses that examined treatments for specific conditions such as depression, insomnia, smoking cessation, and bulimia. He concluded that 74% showed evidence of differential treatment effects. He noted that behavioral (including cognitive and cognitive-behavioral) treatments showed clear superiority to other treatments for child maladaptation, child abuse, juvenile delinquency, and panic-agoraphobia. On the basis of his review, Reid concluded that there was little evidence to support the Dodo bird verdict.
In the most direct test of the Dodo bird verdict to date, Wampold, Mondin, Moody, Stich, Benson, et al. (1997) results actually reveals that their data provided strong evidence for a lack of treatment equivalence. As Crits-Cristoph (1997) and Hunsley and Di Giulio (2002) pointed out, the majority of studies included in their analysis compared one type of cognitive-behavioral treatment to another cognitive-behavioral treatment; thus, even if warranted, the conclusion of psychotherapy equivalence could only be confidently The final meta-analysis reviewed by Hunsley and Di Giulio (2002) was that of Shadish, Matt, Navarro, and Phillips (2000) . These researchers meta-analyzed 90 treatment outcome studies of clinically representative psychotherapy, only selecting studies in which clients, treatments, and therapists were representative of typical and equivalence," "dodo bird," "psychotherapy and meta-analysis," "empirically supported treatments," "allegiance," "psychotherapy efficacy," "differential treatment," "common factors," and "comparative treatment." We then searched among the meta-analyses generated by this search strategy and selected only those studies in which the effects of different psychotherapies were compared via statistical analysis, not simply visual inspection.
We found only one comprehensive meta-analysis published since 2002 that included a range of treatments for a range of client conditions (Luborsky, et al., 2002) and six other more focused meta-analyses that examined treatment effects for short-term psychodynamic psychotherapy versus other treatments for various patient conditions (Leichsenring, Rabung, & Leibing, 2004) , sex-offenders (Lösel & Schmucker, 2005) , CBT for panic disorder with and without agoraphobia (Mitte, 2005) , CBT and self-regulatory treatments for chronic low back pain (Hoffman, Papas, Chatkoff, & Kerns, 2007) , and child and adolescent disorders (mostly Luborsky and colleagues' comprehensive meta-analysis. Luborsky et al. (2002) examined 17 meta-analyses of comparative treatment studies and reported a mean d value of 0.20; they described this value as nonsignificant, although the precise nature of the statistical analysis used to reach this conclusion is not clear. Although not discussed in their review, there were a number of primary research studies that were used in more than one of the meta-analyses they examined. Accordingly, the effect sizes reported in the 17 meta-analyses are not independent of each other. The precise impact these dependencies had on the accuracy and generalizability of their findings is hard to estimate, especially as only three of the meta-analyses contained over 10 studies, but it does raise questions about the accuracy of the .20 value they reported.
When commenting on their findings in a subsequent article, they stated "Our impression is that the occasional differences are likely to be attributable to chance factors, after all results are taken together" (Luborsky et al., 2003, p.458) . However, in our view, these differences are important given that the overall effect size Were obtained differences between treatments due primarily to chance factors? Upon further examination of Luborsky et al.'s (2002) findings, it seems unlikely, as it is possible to discern some distinctive patterns in their results. Sixteen meta-analytic estimates involved comparisons among psychotherapies, with one involving a comparison between psychotherapy and pharmacotherapy. Of the 16 effect sizes, 5 involved comparisons within the family of CBT approaches (e.g., cognitive vs. behavioral), with only 1 being statistically significant. There were three significant comparisons between variants of CBT and a group of treatments labeled as "general verbal" treatments, with all three favoring CBT. Four meta-analytic results compared the CBT family of treatments to the psychodynamic family of treatments, with only one significant result (favoring CBT). Finally, there were 4 comparisons between the psychodynamic family of treatments and other treatments (described as nonspecific, nonpsychiatric, psychiatric, and other, respectively), and none of these comparisons was significant. Thus, 4 of 5 significant results involved comparisons between cognitive-behavioral treatments and treatments based on other theoretical orientations.
It has been suggested that research allegiance to a particular theoretical orientation may result in delivering the preferred treatment in a more sophisticated and informed manner (Luborsky et al., 1993; Luborsky et al., 1999) . Luborsky and colleagues (2002) comparative treatment studies; when applied to their meta-analytic findings, this resulted in a corrected mean d value of 0.14 (in contrast to the original 0.20). There are significant problems when dealing with research allegiance statistically, as this is likely to overcorrect for any researcher allegiance effect that may have had a biasing influence on study results (Hunsley & Di Giulio, 2002) .
Focused meta-analyses. Leichsenring et al. (2004) conducted a meta-analysis of 17 randomized studies of short-term psychodynamic psychotherapy (STPP) across a range of patient conditions (social phobia, PTSD, depression, cocaine and opiate dependence, personality disorders, chronic functional dyspepsia, and anorexia and bulimia nervosa). Some of these studies were also included in the meta-analyses used by Luborsky et al. (2002) . They included only randomized controlled trials which compared an STPP to another active treatment and required that treatment manuals were used and therapists were experienced in STPP or specifically trained in none of which was statistically significant when analyses were conducted separately for (a) pretherapy-posttherapy effect size differences and then (b) posttherapyfollow-up effect size differences in target symptoms, general psychiatric symptoms, and social functioning. These results are very promising in terms of the efficacy of STPP. However, given that the between-group comparisons were calculated with only 7 to 15 studies and with small sample sizes within each treatment group in all but two of the studies, the power to detect small differences that may exist between treated groups was very low.
In the most comprehensive meta-analysis of sex-offender treatment to date, Lösel and Schmucker (2005) examined controlled treatment outcome evaluations published prior to 2004. Outcome was defined as recidivism; the authors followed a broad definition of recidivism, ranging from incarceration to lapse behavior. Sixtynine studies containing 80 independent comparisons between treated and untreated offenders were analyzed. Although physical treatments (including physical castration and hormonal treatment) had much higher effects than psychosocial treatments (odds ratio = 7.37 vs. 1.32, respectively, largely due to the extreme effects of physical castration), only CBT (OR = 1.45) and behavioral treatments (OR = 2.19) had a significant impact on sexual recidivism. With odds ratios close to 1, the other approaches (including therapeutic community, insight-oriented, other and psychosocial treatments) did not significantly influence recidivism. Mitte (2005) conducted a meta-analysis of (randomized and nonrandomized) behavioral, CBT, and pharmacological treatments for panic disorder with and without agoraphobia. Mitte computed the average of between-treatment (behavioral versus CBT) effect size differences across studies, and found no significant differences for anxiety symptoms (mean d=0.09, effect sizes ranged from -0.07 to 0.24; n=26 studies), but found significant differences in favor of CBT for associated depressive symptoms (mean d=0.18, effect sizes ranged from 0.01 to 0.35; n=22 studies). As suggested previously, it is hardly surprising that significant differences are not always found (especially within a small sample of studies) when comparing various forms of behavioral and cognitive-behavioral treatments. follow-up in effect size between the EBT and UC groups was a significant d = 0.38.
Notably, the superiority of EBTs over UC was not due to the use of homework to facilitate treatment generalization, efforts to ensure treatment integrity in the EBTs, research therapists delivering EBTs, theoretical allegiance of the researchers, evidence from voluntary treatment seekers, or differences in treatment setting. EBT superiority was not reduced by high levels of youth severity, comorbidity, or by inclusion of minority youths as study participants. When data from multiple informants (i.e., youth, parents, and teachers) were combined, they found an overall mean d of 0.34. This was significantly less than the mean d of 0.99 found in previous meta-analysis for the treatment of depression and less than the mean effect size typically found for the treatment of youth disorders in general. One element of their analysis involved determining whether treatments that emphasized cognitive change were more effective than treatments that did not. As is evident in a number of the meta-analyses just reviewed, researchers sometimes conduct analyses to test for treatment equivalence using a relatively small number of studies, many of which have small sample sizes. It is important for readers of meta-analyses to remember that meta-analytic methods are not a simple statistical remedy for improving upon underpowered studies often found in the clinical treatment literature. Combining data from multiple treatment outcome studies may well provide a better estimate of the "true" impact of the treatment than is possible with one single study. However, comparing different treatments on the basis of such meta-analytic estimates can be problematic. If only a handful of underpowered studies are used to estimate a treatment effect, the accuracy of the estimate may be poor and the meta-analytic comparison may, itself, be underpowered to detect differences between the compared treatments. Similar problems will occur if the treatment comparisons are based on a small number of underpowered comparative treatment studies.
Like the distribution of most psychological data, meta-analytic estimates are distributed around the "true" population mean value of the treatment effect (see Schmidt, 1992) . Estimates derived from a small set of studies, involving relatively small sample sizes, are likely to be found across the distribution, not just clustered near the population mean. As with all data, sample estimates are likely to more accurately reflect the population mean if the sample is large and generally representative. This elementary statistical fact is as true for secondary data analysis (i.e., meta-analytic data) as it is for data obtained for primary studies. randomized trials (two effectiveness trials and 10 efficacy trials) in which (a) two active treatments were compared or (b) a treatment was compared to whatever treatments were usually offered in the clinical setting (i.e., treatment as usual). In all instances, to be included in our presentation, researchers must have conducted statistical analyses directly comparing the outcomes of patients in the differing treatment conditions. Table 1 presents a summary of the studies. Every study we found included a variant of CBT, broadly defined, as one of the tested treatments. Inspection of Table   1 reveals that many of the treatments resulted in substantial patient improvement.
However, in nine of the studies, one treatment was significantly more efficacious than the other(s). This finding was obtained in both adequately powered and underpowered studies. In three studies, no treatment differences were reported:
Christensen, Atkins, Yi, Baucom, and George (2006) Insert Table 1 about here One study merits particular attention. In comparing dialectic behavior therapy (DBT) to treatment as usual, Linehan et al. (2006) attended to several methodological suggestions made by treatment researchers to ensure fairness in comparative treatment studies. Specifically, in order to maximize internal validity, they controlled for: availability of treatment, assistance finding and getting to a first appointment with a therapist, hours of individual psychotherapy offered, therapist sex, therapist training, therapist clinical experience, and therapist expertise (with the alternative treatment group therapists having more expertise), availability of group clinical consultation, allegiance to treatment approach, institutional prestige associated with treatment, and general factors associated with receiving psychotherapy. Therapists delivering the alternative treatment (community treatment by experts; CTBE) were nominated by community mental health leaders as experts at treating difficult clients. The content and dosage of therapy was not prescribed by the researchers (i.e., experts could treat clients how they saw fit within the constraints of seeing clients at least once per week), the study paid for CTBE at the same rate as for DBT, and no participants were dropped because of failure to pay. Even when controlling for these factors, which have been shown in previous research to be salient to treatment outcome across a variety of treatment modalities, the DBT group was half as likely as the comparison group to attempt suicide during the treatment year, and used crisis services significantly less (1% of DBT patients went to the emergency department at least once for any type of psychiatric emergency, versus 57.8% of CBTE patients).
Implications for Psychotherapy Research
Taken together, the empirical evidence clearly indicates that, when statistical comparisons have adequate power to detect differences, psychotherapy nonequivalence is the rule, not the exception. Across age groups and patient conditions, most researchers have found that some treatments are superior to others. That being said, it also appears that searching for differences among variants of CBT may not always yield statistically significant findings.
From our perspective, there is little to be gained from more research comparing one treatment to another-the Dodo bird verdict is generally not supported in welldesigned and adequately powered studies. The only circumstance in which comparative treatment studies can be useful is when a new and promising treatment is compared to a treatment of established efficacy. It could be argued that, if a new treatment is to be tested for a condition in which there is already extensive replicated evidence of treatment efficacy for an established treatment, it would not be ethical to compare the new treatment to a no-treatment control group. Instead of conducting a treatment outcome study, it may be most appropriate to contrast the new treatment to an established treatment in a comparative treatment design, rather than withhold from patients access to a treatment known to be efficacious. Nevertheless, many comparative treatment studies not involving new treatments will undoubtedly continue to be conducted. Based on available evidence, and assuming they have sufficient power to detect group differences, most such studies will continue to find that treatments are not equivalent in their clinical effects. Knowing full well that such studies are to be conducted, we join with a growing number of researchers in suggesting that these studies should be designed to also provide information on both mechanisms and mediators of efficacious treatment (e.g., Jensen, Weersing, Hoagwood, & Goldman, 2005; Kazdin, in press ).
We need to know much more about how and why treatments work or fail to work, not just that one treatment is better than another. This type of information is especially important because, as shown repeatedly in the meta-analytic literature,
treatments that fail to demonstrate their superiority in comparative trials still, nonetheless, demonstrate efficacy with respect to some conditions for some patients. Do all therapies exert their influence through the same mechanisms? If some therapies work via different mechanisms, is it possible to develop a treatment that optimally combines these differing mechanisms? These are the types of questions that need to be answered in order to truly advance our knowledge about the effects of psychological treatments.
Implications for Evidence-Based Psychological Practice
For some clinical conditions, the inescapable conclusion based on many hundreds of treatment studies is that some specific forms of psychological treatment should be (http://www.aacap.org/page.ww?section=Practice+Parameters&name=Practice+Par ameters). It is also important to recognize that there are some conditions for which there may be multiple treatment options that work relatively well, including adult depression and couple conflict (see Hunsley & Lee, 2006) . Unfortunately, the emphasis within the field on establishing psychotherapy equivalence or treatment superiority has resulted in a rather substantial blind spot for many psychotherapy researchers and, possibly, clinicians. Some treatments are better than others but, as stated above, that does not mean that the less efficacious treatments are worthless. It is very important to know that a treatment is likely to be most beneficial to a client, but it is also important to know that, if the treatment fails to works for a specific client, there is another viable to consider, even if this alternative treatment has been found to be somewhat less efficacious in clinical trials. The movement to promote EBTs in clinical practice is precisely about encouraging the use of all treatments that have been shown to work in sound empirical investigations (e.g., Hunsley, 2007, in press ).
Consider what is known about the impact of psychotherapy as routinely delivered in clinical settings. Hansen, Lambert, and Forman (2002) analyzed data from over 6,000 adult patients seen in a range of clinical settings (e.g., employee assistance programs, university counseling centers, community mental health clinics, and health maintenance organizations). In this large data set only 35% of clients met criteria for improvement or recovery. Very similar outcome results (29% of patients met criteria for improvement) were recently reported by Wampold and Brown (2005) in their sample of over 6,100 adult patients who received therapy services through a managed care organization. In a meta-analysis of 2,500 clients in "real world" clinical practice, Lambert et al. (2003) found that less than a quarter of patients usually make substantial gains in treatment. Furthermore, a meta-analysis of studies of usual clinical care for children and adolescents indicated that obtained effect sizes averaged about zero (mean d = 0.01; Weisz, 2004; Weisz, Donenberg, Han, & Weiss, 1995) .
In contrast to these findings, across 28 studies of EBTs, involving over 2,100 adult patients, Hansen et al. (2002) found that 57% of patients met criteria for recovery by the end of treatment, and fully two-thirds met criteria for improvement or recovery. Is there evidence that EBTs can work in real world clinical settings? Hunsley and Lee (2007) reviewed 35 treatment effectiveness studies for adult (N=21) and child/adolescent disorders (N=14). They included only studies that were designed to test an efficacious treatment (i.e., that had been previously tested in at least one efficacy study) in a routine clinical setting. They reported that the treatments provided in these effectiveness studies typically obtained outcome results comparable to those found in meta-analytic summaries of the efficacy studies on the same treatments. These findings suggest that treatments with established efficacy can be transported to clinical settings without any substantial loss of effectiveness.
When combined with the growing evidence base showing that EBTs are superior to usual clinical services (Addis et al., 2003; Linehan et al., 2006; Mufson et al., 2004; , the need for dissemination and utilization of all, not just the best, EBTs is obvious.
Conclusion
Based on decades of research, it is clear that all psychotherapies are decidedly not equivalent in their clinical impact. Even among efficacious treatments, the mean difference between treatments is frequently estimated to be approximately d = .20 (Luborsky et al., 2003; . If d = .20 is the best estimate of differences between efficacious treatments, and assuming a normal distribution of individual study results, it is entirely expected that there will be some instances of treatment equivalence in the literature. Whether these instances are informative or meaningful is, however, a separate issue. Based on evidence to date, a small number of these instances of treatment equivalence may be very interesting and clinically useful (e.g., finding that two very different types of treatment yield comparable results), some are only relatively informative (e.g., finding that different forms of CBT yield comparable results), and some, frankly, are misleading and irrelevant (e.g., finding that two treatments yield comparable results in studies without adequate power to detect group differences).
In this era of enhanced professional accountability and evidence-based health care, it is unlikely that evaluators, including policymakers, third party payers, and prospective clients, will be as benign and generous as the Dodo bird was in declaring all therapies to be "winners" (Winter, 2006) . However, in promoting the fact that some treatments are better than others, we must not throw the proverbial "baby" out with the "bathwater." If, despite persistent attempts by a clinician skilled in the provision of the first line treatment, insufficient progress is made in therapy, the responsible step is to consider alternative treatment options that have some supporting empirical evidence. Turning to second and third line treatments is routinely done in psychiatry and in other areas of medicine, and there is no reason that psychotherapy patients should expect any less attention from clinicians to the full range of available evidence-based psychotherapy options.
